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We prove the conjectured existence of Bound Information, a classical analog of bound entangle-
ment, in the multipartite scenario. We give examples of tripartite probability distributions from
which it is impossible to extract any kind of secret key, even in the asymptotic regime, although they
cannot be created by local operations and public communication. Moreover, we show that bound
information can be activated: three honest parties can distill a common secret key from different
distributions having bound information. Our results demonstrate that quantum information theory
can provide useful insight for solving open problems in classical information theory.
PACS numbers:
In 1993, Maurer introduced the following scenario for
information-theoretically secure secret-key agreement [1]:
several parties, including a possible adversary, share par-
tially correlated (classical) information. The honest par-
ties aim to establish a secret key, processing this in-
formation with local operations and public communi-
cation (LOPC). The secret key has to be completely
uncorrelated to the adversary’s information. Because
information-theoretically secure secret bits cannot be cre-
ated by LOPC, all the secrecy has to come from the cor-
relations that they initially have. Maurer’s formulation
shares many similarities with the standard scenario of en-
tanglement manipulations in quantum information the-
ory. There, several separated parties share many copies
of a multipartite quantum state, which specifies the kind
of quantum correlations existing among them and the en-
vironment. Their goal is to obtain pure-state entangle-
ment applying only local operations and classical com-
munication (LOCC). A pure state is uncorrelated to the
environment. Then, the environment plays the same role
as the adversary in cryptography. The analogy between
both scenarios was first explored in Ref. [2] and later
developed in Refs. [3, 4].
Given a state ρ in a composite system of several par-
ties, two fundamental questions in quantum information
theory are: (i) can it be prepared by LOCC? and (ii) can
pure-state entanglement be extracted from many copies
of ρ by LOCC? These questions, that still remain un-
solved, define the separability and distillability problems
(see for instance [5]). Despite the natural expectation
that all entangled states were distillable, in 1998 the
Horodecki family showed the existence of the so-called
bound entangled states [6]. These are states from which
it is impossible to extract pure-state entanglement al-
though they cannot be created by LOCC. Following the
analogy between the entanglement and key-agreement
scenarios, Gisin and Wolf conjectured and gave evidence
for the existence of a classical analog of bound entangle-
ment, the so-called bound information [2]. This consists
on information shared among several honest parties and
an eavesdropper such that (i) it is impossible for the hon-
est parties to extract a secret key, and (ii), this informa-
tion cannot be distributed by LOPC.
In this work we present the first provable examples of
multipartite bound information. Remarkably, our exam-
ples can be activated in the same sense as in the quantum
case. That is, after LOPC processing different kinds of
bound information, a secret key can be obtained. The
intuition used to get these results entirely comes from
already known examples of bound entangled states in
three-qubit systems. Our work then, constitutes one of
the first situations where the quantum information in-
sight gives the answer to an open problem in classical
information theory [7]. Indeed, up to now the flow of re-
sults has mainly been in the opposite direction, e.g. the
quantum protocols for entanglement distillation of Ref.
[8] were derived from existing classical protocols for key
distillation. But before proving our results, let us review
some known facts about secret-key distillation.
In his original formulation of the key-agreement prob-
lem, Maurer just considered the bipartite scenario: two
honest parties (Alice and Bob) connected by an authentic
but otherwise insecure classical communication channel,
such that, a possible eavesdropper (Eve) learns the whole
communication between them. Additionally, each party
—including Eve— has access to correlated information
given by repeated realizations of the random variables
A, B and E (possessed by Alice, Bob and Eve respec-
tively), jointly distributed according to P (A,B,E). The
goal for Alice and Bob is to obtain a common string of
random bits for which Eve has virtually no information,
i.e. a secret key. The maximal amount of secret key
bits that can be asymptotically extracted per realization
of (A,B) used, is called the secret key rate, denoted by
S(A : B ‖ E). This quantity can be seen as the analog
of the distillable entanglement, Ed [9]. More recently,
the so-called information of formation Iform(A;B|E), has
been introduced in [10] as the analog of the entanglement
cost, Ec [9]. Given P (A,B,E), it can be understood
as the minimal number of secret key bits asymptotically
needed to generate each independent realization of (A,B)
2—distributed according to P (A,B)—, such that the in-
formation about (A,B) contained in the messages ex-
changed through the public channel is at most equal to
the information in E [11]. A probability distribution can
be established by LOPC if and only if Iform = 0. Using
these quantities, we can now define bound information.
A probability distribution P (A,B,E) contains bound in-
formation when the following two conditions hold [12]:
S(A : B ‖ E) = 0
Iform(A : B|E) > 0 . (1)
A useful upper bound for S(A : B ‖ E) is given by the
so-called intrinsic information, introduced in [13]. This
quantity, denoted by I(A : B ↓ E), will play a significant
role in the proof of our results. The intrinsic information
between A and B given E is defined as:
I(A : B ↓ E) = min
E→E˜
I(A : B|E˜) , (2)
where the minimization runs over all possible stochastic
maps P (E˜|E) defining a new aleatory variable E˜. The
quantity I(A : B|E) is the mutual information between
A and B conditioned on E. It can be written as
I(A : B|E) = H(A,E)+H(B,E)−H(A,B,E)−H(E) ,
(3)
where H(X) is the Shannon entropy of the aleatory vari-
able X . The intrinsic information also gives a lower
bound for the information of formation [10], thus
S(A : B ‖ E) ≤ I(A : B ↓ E) ≤ Iform(A : B|E) . (4)
The generalization of Maurer’s formulation to the mul-
tipartite scenario is straightforward. In our case, three
honest parties —Alice, Bob and Clare— are connected
by a broadcast public communication channel which is
totally accessible to the eavesdropper —Eve— but that
she cannot tamper. As it happens in entanglement the-
ory, the generalization of the secret key rate (Ed) and the
information of formation (Ec) to the multipartite case
may not be univoque [4]. Anyhow, the idea of multi-
partite bound information is unambiguous: a probability
distribution P (A,B,C,E) contains bound information if
1. No pair of honest parties —even with the help of
the third one— can generate a secret key from
many copies of P (A,B,C,E). This also prevents
the possibility of distilling a tripartite secret key
[14], because from it, a bipartite key between any
pair of parties could be generated, giving a contra-
diction (see the note [15]).
2. Its distribution by LOPC is not possible. More
precisely, a large number of realizations of the
aleatory variables A, B and C following the re-
duced probability distribution P (A,B,C), cannot
be distributed among Alice, Bob and Clare if the
broadcasted messages are constrained to contain at
most the information of the variable E [11].
Having collected all these facts, let us prove the main
result of this work, namely the existence of bound infor-
mation.
Our example of bound information is given by the fol-
lowing probability distribution, denoted by P1:
A B C E P1(A,B,C,E)
0 0 0 0 1/6
0 0 1 1 1/6
0 1 0 2 1/6
1 0 1 3 1/6
1 1 0 4 1/6
1 1 1 0 1/6
This is the probability distribution that one obtains af-
ter measuring the three-qubit bound entangled state ρ1,
given in the Eq. (17) of Ref. [16], in the computational
basis. Note that P1(0, 1, 1) = P (1, 0, 0) = 0 and this
distribution is invariant, up to a relabeling of E, under
interchange of B and C. In what follows, it is seen that
from these correlations, it is impossible to extract a se-
cret key between any pair of parties, even with the help
of the third one.
First, consider the bipartite splitting AB − C, where
Alice and Bob are allowed to perform joint (secret) oper-
ations, i.e. they are connected by a private channel. It is
easy to see that I(AB : C|E) = p (E = 0) I(AB : C|E =
0) = 1/3. Now, applying the stochastic map E → E˜
corresponding to: 1→ 0, 4→ 0 and identity for the rest
of the values, we obtain I(AB : C|E˜) = 0. That is, the
intrinsic information (2) vanishes, and because of (4) we
have that
S(AB : C ‖ E) = 0 . (5)
This implies that Clare cannot establish a secret key with
Alice nor with Bob (even in the favorable situation where
Alice and Bob are together). Because P1 is symmetric
with respect to B and C, we also have that Bob cannot
extract a key with Alice nor with Clare. Therefore, no
secret key between any pair of parties can be generated
from many copies of P1 by LOPC.
Notice that P1 contains some kind of secret correla-
tions, although they are not distillable in the previous
scenarios. This fact becomes manifest when we allow Bob
and Clare to perform joint operations. In this case, we
have again that I(BC : A|E) = 1/3. But now, it is possi-
ble to construct a key distillation protocol achieving this
rate: Bob and Clare announce publicly the cases where
they have B = C, without saying the specific value. Each
of these filtered realizations of P1, that happen with prob-
ability 1/3, contains one secret bit shared between A and
BC. Therefore,
S(A : BC ‖ E) = I(A : BC ↓ E) =
1
3
. (6)
3This condition cannot be satisfied by those probability
distributions created by LOPC, since in this case S = 0
for all the bipartite splitting of the honest parties. Hence,
by definition, P1 is an example of bound information,
since it contains non-distillable secret correlations.
As we have seen, the secret correlations present in P1
can be activated when a private channel is established
between Bob and Clare. Indeed, the secret key given to
these two parties allows to activate the already existing
secret correlations with Alice. A similar phenomenon
also happens in the quantum case, e.g. for the state
ρ1 that inspired the construction of P1. An even more
intriguing example of activation of bound entanglement
consists of the fact that the tensor product, and even the
mixture of bound entangled states can contain distillable
entanglement [16, 17]. This process is sometimes called
superactivation of bound entanglement. In the next lines,
we show the analog of superactivation for secret correla-
tions. Again, our example is inspired by the results of
Ref. [16].
Consider the case in which the honest parties have ac-
cess to a source of correlated information that supplies
them with three probability distributions P1, P2 and P3,
where P2 and P3 are cyclic permutation of P1,
P2(A,B,C,E) = P1(B,C,A,E)
P3(A,B,C,E) = P1(C,A,B,E). (7)
Of course, all these distributions contain bound infor-
mation. Using only LOPC, Alice, Bob and Clare can
construct an equally weighted mixture of P1, P2 and P3:
Pmix =
1
3
(P1 + P2 + P3) (8)
An equivalent scenario would consists of a source prepar-
ing randomly the three distributions, in such a way that
the knowledge about the actual distribution is only acces-
sible to Eve. The resulting distribution, Pmix, is detailed
in the following table:
A B C E Pmix(A,B,C,E)
0 0 0 0 1/6
0 0 1 1 1/9
0 1 0 2 1/9
0 1 1 3 1/9
1 0 0 4 1/9
1 0 1 5 1/9
1 1 0 6 1/9
1 1 1 0 1/6
Actually, if one takes into account the total information
accessible to the parties, Eve’s symbol should be equal
to (E, i), where i = {1, 2, 3} specifies the distribution
Pi and E is associated to the triple of random variables
(A,B,C). However, it is easy to see that this distribu-
tion is equivalent to Pmix from the point of view of Eve’s
information on Alice, Bob and Clare’s symbols.
Interestingly, Pmix can be distilled into a tripartite key.
To achieve this goal, the honest parties can use the re-
peated code protocol of Ref. [1], generalized to the mul-
tipartite scenario. It consists of the following steps:
1. Each party takes N realizations of its own random
variable:
A1, A2, . . . AN
B1, B2, . . . BN
C1, C2, . . . CN , (9)
where Ai, Bi, Ci are correlated according to
Pmix(Ai, Bi, Ci, Ei), for every value of i.
2. Alice —or any of the honest parties— generates
locally a random bit sA, computes the numbers
Xi := Ai + sA, where the sum is modulo 2, for
each value of i, and broadcasts through the public
channel the N -bit string:
X1, X2, . . . XN . (10)
3. Bob adds bitwise this string to his symbols
B1, B2, . . . BN . If he obtains the same value for
all of them, Bi + Xi = sB, ∀i, he accepts sB
and communicates the acceptance to the other par-
ties. If not, the N realizations of Pmix are re-
jected. Clare does the same, accepting sC only
when Ci +Xi = sC , ∀i.
For any accepted N -bit string only four cases are pos-
sible: Ai = Bi = Ci ∀i, Ai = Bi 6= Ci ∀i,
Bi = Ci 6= Ai ∀i or Ci = Ai 6= Bi ∀i. The proba-
bility of being in the first case, once the string has been
accepted by Bob and Clare, reads
P (sA = sB = sC |accepted) =
(
2
6
)N
(
2
6
)N
+ 3
(
2
9
)N , (11)
which tends to one for largeN . Thus, this protocol allows
the honest parties to correct all their errors since it only
selects the 000 and 111 events. Note that for these filtered
events, Eve has E = 0 whatever the value of (A,B,C)
is. Therefore, she has no information about sA, so the
parties end sharing a perfect secret bit [18]. This proves
that Pmix is distillable, although it has been generated by
LOPC from three probability distributions that are non-
distillable. We have then that bound information can be
activated with bound information. Let us also mention
that this activation provides per se an alternative proof
of the fact that the initial probability distribution, P1,
contains secret correlations.
To summarize, in this work we have proven the exis-
tence of bound information, a classical analog of bound
4entanglement conjectured in [2], in the tripartite sce-
nario. The intuition for our proof comes from known
examples of bound entangled states in three-qubit sys-
tems. We have also shown that bound information, like
bound entanglement, can be activated: the probabilistic
mixture of three distributions having bound information
gives a distillable distribution. These results are straight-
forward generalizable to an arbitrary number of parties.
Indeed, we have found several examples of probability
distributions having bound secret correlations, which ex-
hibit a wide variety of activation properties. These re-
sults will be given elsewhere.
Of course, it still remains as an open question whether
bound information exists in the bipartite scenario, i.e. to
find probability distributions P (A,B,E) such that 0 =
S < Iform. The previous evidence given in Ref. [2] is now
significantly strengthened by our results. And if it exists,
the next open problem would be to see whether bound
information can be activated, as it seems to happen for
bound entanglement in the bipartite scenario [20].
We would like to conclude mentioning the intrigu-
ing analogies that exist between privacy and entangle-
ment. Very recently, it has been shown that any entan-
gling channel can be seen as a source of privacy [21] and
that a secret key can be extracted even from some non-
distillable quantum states [22]. Our results indeed ex-
ploit this connection, and constitute one example of an
almost unexplored application of quantum information
theory: the use of its formalism to solve open problems
in classical information theory.
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